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Abstract 
The cooperative movement in Poland has a long but difficult history. The socialistic regime 
introduced a command and control system into cooperatives which was destructive to their 
self-governing functions and eventually led to a lack of member involvement. There was a 
mass neglecting and abandonment after the transformation in particular of rural cooperatives. 
Nonetheless, in the early 1990s the first farmers’ cooperative marketing organizations, called 
agricultural producer groups, appeared on the market. They are bottom-up, voluntary organi-
zations whose main purpose is to jointly sell their members’ output Although producer groups 
functions similarly to marketing cooperatives, farmers establishing producer groups have 
been choosing other legal forms than cooperatives. In the paper we investigate why the new 
forms of governance of cooperative arrangements are chosen and what are the implication of 
these choices for the success of the groups on the market. We discuss the impact of invested 
capital, the impact of advisors, and the impact of institutional environment on this choice. The 
empirical data was collected on 62 producer groups functioning in one province of Poland. 
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1 Introduction 
Polish agriculture has been suffering from structural problems for many years, manifested 
mainly in small farms, a surplus of labor, old inefficient machinery, and a lack of investment. 
Establishing farmers’ cooperative organizations, which would help farmers increase the a-
mount of goods offered on the market, save on transaction costs, and overtake a portion of 
profits conventionally gained by middlemen, could be expected as one important response to 
such a problem.  
The cooperative movement in Poland, however, has a long but difficult history, which has 
been causing an aversion among farmers towards cooperation. After World War II, the socia-
list regime introduced a command and control system into cooperatives which was destructive 
to their self-governing functions and eventually led soon after to a lack of member involve-
ment. Cooperative members were not able to make their own decisions; even cooperative lea-
ders were assigned by the state. As the socialistic firms grew in size, their members adopted a 
wage-worker mentality in relation to the enterprise and its property, which resulted in severe 
inefficiencies (CHLOUPKOVA et al. 2003: 249). BRODZIŃSKI (1999: 168) mentions that Polish 
farmers who used to be members of socialist cooperatives still retain a deformed image of the 
cooperative movement. They associate cooperatives with a lack of control and impact on de-
cision-making.  
Nonetheless, in the early 1990s the first farmers’ cooperative marketing organizations, called 
agricultural producer groups, appeared on the market. Producer groups are bottom-up, volun-
tary organizations whose main purpose is to jointly sell their members’ output (MAŁYSZ 
1996: 13-14). Selling the output both improves the market position of the members and may 
lead to higher prices. Additionally, associated farmers may benefit from information and 
knowledge sharing in the group. The formation of producer groups does not, however, imply 
a change in property rights of the means of production. The farmers owe jointly only profits 
worked out as a group; they do not merge their farms.  2 
Although producer groups functions similarly to marketing cooperatives, farmers establishing 
producer groups have been choosing other legal forms than cooperatives. The legal form of 
cooperative is actually adopted by only about 2% of producer groups (BANASZAK 2008a: 76). 
Other groups function as limited liability companies, associations, unions, and also as infor-
mal groups not registered in the court.  
In the paper we investigate why the new forms of governance of cooperative arrangements are 
chosen and what are the implication of these choices for the success of the groups on the mar-
ket. 
Several authors investigated the impact of formal institutional environment on functioning of 
cooperative organizations. HANECHAN and ANDERSON (2001: 6-8) focus mainly on the impor-
tance of external support during the process of establishing cooperative organizations. ZIE-
GENHORN (1999: 68) draws attention to the role played by policy makers and extension advi-
sors in providing and fostering agricultural improvements. KATZ and BOLAND (2002) analyze 
the emergence of new generation cooperatives. The new cooperatives appear mostly in niche 
markets and are characterized by closed membership and fixed amount of the product, which 
must be delivered under threat of sanctioning if members do not fulfill their obligations. The 
new cooperatives introduce sellable shares and ownership in such groups in linked to patro-
nage. MÉNARD and KLEIN (2004: 754) indicate that background conditions of the organization 
of food and agriculture such as the agricultural policy and consumer demands might lead to 
discovering more efficient modes of organization.  
In these terms the Polish producer groups represent an interesting case of an experiment with 
new governance forms of cooperative arrangements. Due to perceived inefficiencies of the 
traditional cooperative form, a variety of new legal and organizational solutions emerged in 
the sector. However, according to our knowledge, no analysis has been undertaken so far on 
the organizational choices made by producer groups and its possible impacts. In the following 
Section, we will provide conceptual underpinnings of the research and derive testable hypo-
thesis based on transaction cost considerations. In the third Section we present methodology 
of the empirical research. Section 4 presents the empirical analysis and Section 5 concludes. 
2 Conceptual Underpinnings 
2.1 Choices Faced by Farmers Considering Cooperation 
A farmer considering starting up or joining a cooperative organization must choose among a 
number of possible options. First, he can decide not to cooperate at all and organize their tran-
sactions in an alternative way. Second, an agricultural producer group is only one of several 
possible forms of cooperation between farmers and involves joint marketing of output produ-
ced individually by members. Numerous forms of alternative cooperation exist, such as joint 
machinery pools or cooperative credit systems (BECKMANN 2000: 94ff.).  
The choice to set up a producer group does not determine the form of cooperation. The bill on 
producer groups does not stipulate which organizational form farmers are required to adopt; 
therefore, they can take any organizational form accepted by Polish law, or they can function 
as an informal group. Regarding groups that choose to adopt a formal organizational form, 
they can choose non-profit forms (e.g. an association or union) or those that enable accumula-
tion of capital (e.g. a commercial company), of which the most popular is a limited liability 
company. Producer groups can also function as cooperatives located somewhere in-between 
non-profit and for-profit organizational forms (BOGUTA 2002: 19). Each of these forms is 
subject to different laws that determine the amount of taxation and ownership relations. A 
summary of the main characteristics of each legal form is presented Table 1. 
The simplest form the organization may take is an informal group. This form does not involve 
any permanent costs and does not bind farmers formally. Cooperation through such groups  
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might however, be very unstable as the members are not legally bound. Moreover, an infor-
mal group cannot officially undertake any economic activity. Such behavior goes against the 
tax law. If, for instance, one of the member farmers buys a larger quantity of fertilizer and 
sells it to other group members, the farmer must officially register the economic activity and 
pay taxes on any profits from it (ZARUDZKI et al. 2001: 25).  
Associations are voluntary and self-governing organizations established to fulfill nonecono-
mic goals. The members work voluntarily for the association, which can employ either mem-
bers or non-members. Associations can represent their members in relations with institutions 
cooperating with farmers and negotiate prices or contracts with purchasers or sellers on behalf 
of farmers. This form can be established easily and cheaply and does not require any start-up 
capital (LEMANOWICZ 2005: 103, ZARUDZKI et al. 2001: 26). Associations have a simple 
structure and low establishment and running costs; however, the partners have no right to 
withdraw the accumulated capital or any profits. The accumulated capital and profits can only 
be spent on organizational activities as defined by the statute (Legislation: 1989, Art. 34). 
Unions are voluntary, self-governing, and independent social and vocational organizations, 
established in order to represent and protect the interests of individual farmer. As with associ-
ations, establishing a union is simple and fast and does not require any start-up capital (LE-
MANOWICZ 2005: 103). Like associations, unions have low set-up and running costs. The 
members have the right to share or withdraw capital; however, the profits must be distributed 
equally among all members (EJSMONT and MILEWSKI 2005: 66).  
A cooperative is a voluntary union of at least five people. Its main purpose is the running of 
an economic activity. As in commercial companies, cooperative members purchase shares, 
but the administration costs are lower than in commercial companies. The cooperative’s pro-
perty is the private property of its members, and members can withdraw the value of their 
shares any time. Each member, however, has equal decision-making power, which limits the 
decision-making impact of major shareholders. Nonetheless, cooperatives have to maintain 
comprehensive bookkeeping. As LEMANOWICZ (2005: 104) points out, cooperatives are cur-
rently unpopular among farmers due to negative experiences with cooperatives during social-
ism. 
Table 1: Comparison of Different Legal Forms Available to Polish Agricultural Groups  
Characteristic Association  Union  LLC  Cooperative 






ber 1982 Social 
and Vocational 
Farmer Organiza-










Purpose  Social Social  and  voca-




Economic, but can 
also be social 
Area of operation  No limitations  The territory of 
Poland 
No limitations  No limitations 
Members  People, or legal 
entities only as 
supportive mem-
bers 
People  People or legal 
entities 




At least 15 people  At least 10 per-
sons, at least 8 of 
whom run a farm 
1 and more  At least 10 people 
or 3 legal entities, 
for agricultural 
production coop-









Not defined  Not defined  At least one share 
with minimal 
value 50 PLN (=13 
EUR) 
At least one share, 
its value defined 
by the general 
assembly 
Participation in 
decision making  
Equal for all mem-
bers 
Equal for all mem-
bers 
Based on number 
of shares 





Equal for all mem-
bers 
Equal for all mem-
bers 
Based on number 
of shares 
Based on number 
of shares 
Member liability  No liability  No liability  Based on value of 
shares 
Based on value of 
shares 
Source: Adapted from LEMANOWICZ (2005: 102) 
For-profit forms, of which the most common form is the limited liability company (LLC), can 
be established by any number of people for any purpose. Its members purchase shares, the 
amount of which determines their decision-making power and their liability. Shareholders are 
owners of the company, and the accumulated capital can be divided among them according to 
the number of purchased shares. However, the LLC establishment process is more complica-
ted and costly and has to be officially registered in a notary office. Similar to cooperatives, 
limited liability companies have to keep comprehensive books and pay taxes on profits (LE-
MANOWICZ 2005: 104).  
The legislation also provides the legal foundation for financial support for producer groups. 
The bill from September 15, 2000 and its subsequent amendments enable all groups registered 
with province offices to obtain support up to the value of 5% turnover in the first year, and 
then 4%, 3%, 2% and 1% in the following years, and defined conditions of registration in the 
province office (Legislation: 2000, Art. 19 § 1). 
The choice of whether to cooperate as a producer group and which organizational form to 
adopt are not the only decisions farmers need to make. Farmers also have to decide on the 
production type marketed by the group, where to locate it, which kind of leadership and 
membership structure to adopt, and the general concept of the group’s vision and mission. 
Empirical evidence shows that producer groups perform different tasks, and, although organi-
zing joint sales of output produced by individual farmers is their main task, some producer 
groups are only engaged in organizing such activities as joint purchases of the means of pro-
duction, joint transportation, and trainings and other social events for farmers (BANASZAK 
2005).  
2.2 Factors Influencing the Organizational Choice 
Producer groups operate in between markets and hierarchies. Their members do not integrate 
property rights and do not merge farms into the organization. It is their own decision when 
and to whom to sell the goods. Thus, we may classify them as hybrid organizations. Hybrid 
arrangements include such different forms as networks, subcontracting, franchising, partners-
hips and some forms of cooperatives (BECKMANN 2000). This variety of forms is “connected 
by the underlying idea that they participate to the same “family” of arrangements among au-
tonomous entities doing business together, mutually adjusting with little help from the price 
system, and sharing or exchanging technologies, capital, products, and services without a uni-
fied ownership” (MÉNARD 2005: 295). A distinctive feature of hybrids is that unlike firms 
they do not integrate property rights; the partners integrate only a part of their resources and 
take jointly only a part of decisions in their domain of choice. “ The emphasis is on the com-
mitment of distinct property rights holders, operating distinct legal entities, but organizing 
some transactions through governance forms mutually agreed upon” (MÉNARD 2005: 294). 
MÉNARD (2005: 295-298) discusses factors which contribute stability to hybrid arrangements. 
Since hybrids tend to be created in highly competitive markets in which pooling resources is a  
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way to survive and decrease uncertainty, the problem faced by hybrids is how to demarcate 
joint decisions, discipline partners and chose conflict resolution mechanisms. As pointed out 
by BORYS and JEMISON (1989: 235) partners in hybrids often have different goals, making the 
resolution of conflicting interests and the maintenance of agreement a central problem.  
The great diversity of hybrid arrangements is not a random outcome. According to Transacti-
on Cost Economics (TCE), the decisions follow mainly transaction cost considerations (WIL-
LIAMSON 1991; MÉNARD 2005a). The adopted forms are aligned with the degree of asset spe-
cificity involved so as to affect a transaction cost minimizing result. This effect is reinforced 
by uncertainty. If the risk of opportunism is higher, hybrids choose more advanced organiza-
tional forms that provide better safeguards for specific investments and economise on coordi-
nation costs by centralized management (VERHAEGEN and VAN HUYLENBROECK 2002). The 
TCE framework also helps to explain why so many diverse organizational forms are adopted 
by producer groups. As the review of organizational forms available for producer groups pre-
sented in Section 2.1 shows, the tighter the forms of control implemented by producer groups, 
the higher their set up and running costs. We may therefore expect that the choice of producer 
groups’ specific organizational form will be a function of the level of specific investment. In 
addition to that, BECKMANN (2000: 121-123) argued that the number of members play a cru-
cial role for the organizational choice. The influence of both factors, specific investments and 
number of members, will be discussed in the following. However, history and path dependen-
ce also matter. That is why sometimes many forms of hybrid organizations with different le-
vels of integration coexist (MÉNARD 2005b: 369). 
The most loose and most affordable form of informal group will most likely be chosen by 
farmers who do not undertake joint investments. Associations require higher investments of 
time and money, and their accumulated capital is legally protected, yet the partners have no 
right to withdraw either the accumulated capital or the profits. These can only be spent on the 
organizational activities as defined in the statutes. Unions have higher set-up costs and give 
their members the right to share profits, which have to be shared equally among all members. 
The most protective but also costly form of the limited liability company will most likely be 
adopted by farmers who undertake considerable investment. Similar founding costs but lower 
running costs are the outcome of the organizational form of cooperative. This form involves 
less control over the capital due to the decision-making process, where each member – regard-
less of his/her invested capital – has equal decision-making power (EJSMONT and MILEWSKI 
2005: 60-69). The legal forms can be ranked from an informal group that has the lowest set-
up costs to a limited liability company which is very costly to set up. As the invested capital 
increases, however, potential appropriation losses and decision-making costs of informal 
group are expected to rise very sharply, since the invested resources are not legally protected 
and the members cannot appeal to the court in case of conflict. In the limited liability compa-
ny which is very costly to set up the property and decision-making rights of members are le-
gally protected and thus both coordination costs and appropriation losses are expected to inc-
rease very slowly as the level of invested capital per member grows (Figure 1). We might 
expect that set up and running costs as well as investment level will be the lowest in informal 
groups and the highest in limited liability companies. 
A second factor affecting coordination and expected appropriation costs is number of mem-
bers. Regarding number of members, entry and exit costs are in particular high in limited li-
ability companies since they have to be always approved in by a notary. Thus we might ex-
pect these groups will be more likely to have fewer members than unions or cooperatives. 6 
 
Figure 1: Coordination Costs and Expected Appropriation Losses as a Function of the 
Investments per Member Level in Different Forms of Producer Groups 
 
3 Sample and Data Collection 
We collected data on producer groups functioning in the Wielkopolska Province. The chosen 
province of Wielkopolska is one of 16 provinces in Poland and is located in the western part 
of the country. The cross-sectional research design was selected as a research method for this 
investigation. This design employed the technique of social survey, which uses a structured 
interview with producer group leaders as the data collection strategy. Fifty functioning groups 
and 12 disbanded groups were subjected to the research. The 50 functioning groups associated 
4,056 farmers; the 12 inactive ones associated 394 farmers. The interviews were carried out in 
early 2005.  
The structured interview with producer group leaders was organized into a questionnaire 
composed of six sections which addressed: (i) general information about the group such as the 
group’s address, legal status, number of members, and activities performed, (ii) the process of 
group formation, (iii) group functioning (divided into three sections: management and decisi-
on-making, production and marketing, and membership), (iv) costs and benefits of cooperati-
on, (v) the role of the institutional environment, and (vi) leadership.  These six sections 
comprised 132 questions in total.  Two types of questions were asked: the first was related to 
facts such as numbers or descriptions of processes, the second to the subjective evaluation of 
these facts (for a full documentation of the questionnaire, see BANASZAK 2008c). 
4 Empirical Results 
4.1 General Information about Producer Groups 
In total 62 producer groups from Wielkopolska Province were subjected to the research. By 
the time when the interview was carried out 50 groups were still operating, 12 groups stopped 
activity. The groups were not equally geographically distributed. Most of them were located 
in the area of Kalisz (19 groups), Poznañ (17 groups) and Leszno (13 groups). The average 
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members, the biggest, in potatoes, associated 700 farmers. Regarding the start up year, most 
of the groups were in 2001.  
On average each disbanded group was functioning for 2.8 years. Regarding the factors which 
resulted in splitting up, the interviewed producer group leaders most frequently pointed to the 
so-called “mentality of the people” problem. It had to do with commitment, loyalty and trust 
in the leader and other members. Two groups did not want to change their purchasers to those 
appointed by the leader, and in three cases the members did not want to compensate the leader 
for his work or to hire a manager. Regarding other cases, two groups reported having prob-
lems with finding purchasers; one group was destroyed by a middleman who offered mem-
bers a higher price if they sold their output outside the group; in one case the group was em-
bedded in a conflict between two neighboring villages, and inhabitants of one village spread 
false information about the leader in order to destroy the group; and in the last case the leader 
pocketed the groups’ money and members did not want to continue cooperation afterwards. 
Considering the main output produced by the members, the prevailing number of them were 
dealing with pork (35), 13 groups were in different kinds of vegetables, 4 in fruits, and 3 in 
grains. There was only one group involved in each of potatoes, pork and cattle, hops, mush-
rooms, poultry, and rape, and one group of described as of ‘general’ character.  
Twelve groups split-up and were no longer functioning when the research was carried out. 
Regarding the functioning groups, joint sales of the output produced by the members were 
conducted by 80% of the groups. Seventy eight percent of the groups organized different 
kinds of training and educational trips for their members, 68% of the groups organized joint 
purchases of the means of production, 56% integration events, and 28% joint transportation of 
the output. A few groups were also performing some other, less common kinds of activities. 
For instance four groups organized insurance for the members, three other groups were sor-
ting, packing and storing the products together, two groups were preliminarily processing the 
output (one group was slaughtering pigs, and one was drying and purifying rape). Another 
interesting finding was that members of one group in tomatoes were producing the product 
together, jointly owning the land and the means of production (like in an old style cooperati-
ve). A few other groups also reported organizing self-credits for members (self-credits are 
member contributions to a common fund from which members can obtain emergency interest-
free loans). 
Most of groups had been initiated by one of the farmers (58%); the other 42% had been initia-
ted by an outside organization, 24% by the extension service and 18% by outside business-
men such as processing companies, local agricultural cooperatives or middlemen. On average 
each group collected 6,461 EUR as start-up capital (365 EUR per member).  
4.2 The Choice of the Legal Form 
The most common legal forms of the groups were ‘associations’ and ‘unions’. Twenty-three 
groups adopted the legal form of associations, 18 of unions, 14 of limited liability companies, 
5 of informal groups, and only 2 groups were functioning as cooperatives. During the process 
of group formation also other forms of cooperation were taken into account. Seventy-four 
percent of the groups considered also union as an alternative legal form, 71% considered also 
associations, 59% thought about limited liability companies, 45% thought about cooperatives, 
and 14.5% of informal groups. Regarding the reason why the current legal form was chosen 
we asked about the role of tax considerations, access to dept financing, size of membership, or 
due to the fact that other forms were too costly. The biggest fraction of the groups pointed that 
other forms were too costly as a major factor for the choice (43.5%). This argument was ran-
ked as a major factor by 60% of associations, 60% of informal groups, and 50% of unions; 
while only 7% of limited liability companies and none cooperative referred to this argument 8 
as a major one which influenced the choice of this form. The access to dept financing and the 
size of membership were not ranked as important overall, except or some LLCs (Table 2). 
Table 2: Factors affecting the choice of the legal forms according to legal forms  
Informal 
Groups  Associations Unions  LLC Cooperatives
Factor 
Mean asnwer (1-not a factor, 2-minor factor, 3-major factor) 
Tax 
considerations  2.6 1.6 1.3 1.1 1 
Access to dept 
financing  1 1 1  1.1  1 
Size of member-
ship precluded 
other forms  1 1 1  1.1  1 
Other forms 
were too costly  2.2 2.2  2  1.2 1 
Source: Producer group survey, Wielkopolska, 2005; for survey details see BANASZAK (2008c) 
Among other important factors for choosing the certain legal forms the interviewees mentio-
ned advice of a lawyer (16%), advice of extension service (14.5%), or advice of other groups 
(1.6%); that the chosen form was not binding capital of the members and thus easy and safe 
(17.7%); that the chosen form was transparent and provided clear business rules (8.1%); that 
they didn’t have knowledge or were not aware of other forms (8.1%); that the form was cheap 
(4.8%), that the form had democratic rules (4.8%), and that the form was well perceived or 
well experienced (3.2%). 
Interestingly, majority of the groups (71%) declared that they did not choose the cooperative 
form due to a bad connotation this word with the old regime and also with an enterprise from 
which everybody was stealing. Additionally, such justifications for not choosing this form 
were used as: bed perception of the form either by farmers who remembered from their own 
or parents’ experience that their were forced to joined cooperatives during socialism; bad per-
ception of cooperatives on the market by business partners who were afraid of signing 
contract with a cooperative; bad example – many cooperatives collapsed after the transforma-
tion; that this form is not suitable for “modern times”; or that cooperatives have to be large 
and associate at least 1000-2000 members to be profitable. Further 9.7% of the groups did not 
choose the cooperative form because they preferred to choose less binding legal structures. 
Eight percent considered this form as a not sufficient for investing capital due to problems 
with distributing income, too high taxes, or possible mismanagement of capital due to the one 
member one vote principle and 6% of the interviewees argued that the cooperative law is not 
sufficient. One group (1.6%) argued the reason for not choosing the cooperative form was 
lack of cooperative traditions in the area. A small fraction of the groups (6%) could not 
explain or did not remember what was the reason for not choosing the cooperative form. 
Thus, the results show that indeed the set-up and running costs as well as tax considerations 
pay an important role for the choice of less binding forms of cooperation, whereas these fac-
tors were not of importance for limited liability companies and cooperatives. Actually, mem-
bership size and access to external capital did not play any significant role at all. 
In order to explore the suspected central role of specific investments and membership, Figure 
3 shows the distribution of legal forms according to the level of invested capital (vertical axis) 
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Figure 3: Distributions of groups according to start-up capital (in PLN) and number of 
members 
Source: Producer group survey, Wielkopolska, 2005; for survey details see BANASZAK (2008c) 
As it can be seen form Figure 3, the informal groups show, as expected, the lowest level of 
investments, LLCs the highest. And the largest producer groups in terms of membership are 
unions and cooperatives. Multinomial logit regressions on the relationship between the de-
pendent variable legal form and independent variables of starting-up capital and number of 
members show that unions are in particular chosen when number of members is high, limited 
liability companies are chosen when the start-up capital per person is high and cooperatives 
are chosen when both start-up capital and number of members is high (Table 3).  
Table 3: Mulitnominal logit regression results for the legal forms, start-up capital and 
number of members 
Legal form (association is the base line)  Independent variable  Regression results 
Number of members  .003  
.008  Informal group 
Start-up capital per member  -.016 
 .012  
Number of members  .008 (*) 
.005  Union 
Start-up capital per member  .002  
.002  
Number of members  -.001  
 .009  Limited liability company 
Start-up capital per member  .004 
.002 (***) 
Number of members  .011 (*) 
.006  
Cooperative  Start-up capital per member  .004 
.002 (**)    
Pseudo R2  .264 
Number of observations  62 
† The upper line in the row indicates coefficient; the bottom one indicates standard error 
*** significant at .01 level 
** significant at .05 level 
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The results clearly support the theoretical framework developed in Section 2. The level of 
specific investments per member and the size of membership are relevant factors for the 
choice of the organizational forms chosen. However, the set-up and running costs as well as 
tax considerations play role as well if investment levels are low. Cooperatives, indeed, com-
bine sizable membership with considerable investments per member, but suffer from a bad 
reputation. It is quite likely that some producer groups chose the organizational form of asso-
ciations, unions or LLC although that would have done better with a cooperative. In order to 
assess performance, the following section will reflect on the self-evaluation of the choices 
made. 
4.3 Satisfaction with the Chosen Legal Form and Implications for the Group Success 
Only nine groups (14.5%) during the time of their functioning decided to change the initially 
chosen legal from. In all cases the change was from less binding and less advanced form to a 
more binding one. In three cases the change was from an association to union, in another three 
cases from union to a limited liability company, in one case from a registered partnership (a 
form of a commercial company) to a limited liability company. In additional two cases, the 
changes were initiated - in one case from an association to a limited liability company and in 
the other from a union to a limited liability company, however, in both cases the change did 
not fully happen as the groups were disbanded in the process. The change was in majority of 
the cases motivated by switching to a form which would provide more clear business rules 
and encourage accumulation of the capital (6 groups) or to switch to a form which would e-
nable obtaining the subsidies for producer groups from the government (2 groups).  
Overall 62.9% of groups declared to be satisfied with the current legal from, 11.3% were par-
tially satisfied, 22.6 were not satisfied, and for 3.2% (two groups) it was difficult to say. Ac-
cordingly with the number of groups within the given legal form, the highest percent of dissa-
tisfied with their legal form groups were among groups which were functioning as associati-
ons. The highest satisfaction rate was among groups which were functioning as cooperatives 
and unions (Table 3). It is worth to note that, although cooperatives earn a bad reputation, the 
level of satisfaction with this organizational form is actually the highest.  
Table 4: Satisfaction with the chosen legal form 
Legal 
form/satisfaction 









Informal 60  20  20  0  5 
Association 43.5  17.4  34.8  4.3  23 
Union 77.8 5.6  11.1  5.6  18 
Limited liability 
company 
71.4 7.1 21.4 0  14 
Cooperative 100  0  0  0  2 
Source: Producer group survey, Wielkopolska, 2005; for survey details see BANASZAK (2008c) 
The dissatisfaction was mainly related to disappointment from choosing a form, which did not 
bind members and their capital what in consequence, resulted in low commitment or that the 
form was not advanced enough to operate on the market or obtain the subsidies. One inter-
viewee said:  
We wanted to escape from accounting but it was impossible. Accounting is necessary for the transparency 
within the group. In addition, if we have had decided at the beginning to establish a company or a coop-
erative and pay shares, the members would have been more attached to the group. As we didn’t, the 
members are selling products where they want, do not respect what the group agreed upon.  
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A few complains coming mainly from limited liability companies were related to costs of 
running and the bureaucracy, papers, and documents involved in the operation.  
Banaszak (2008b), who analyzed determinants of success and failure of producer groups, 
shows that the governance form of association is more frequent among groups that failed than 
among those that achieved either partial or full success. Regarding the question of why the 
form of association was chosen, we see a large impact of the extension service. Thirty percent 
of groups functioning as associations chose this form due to advice of the extension service. 
Others chose it because it was considered a “loose” form, which did not require capital in-
vestments (17%), because it was a cheap form (13%), because it was considered to provide a 
sufficient level of security (8%), or because farmers were not aware that there are other forms 
available (8%).  
There is also an interesting question of the outlying groups scattered on the graphs presented 
in Figure 3 and possible mismatch of their governance forms. All groups having an outlining 
high number of members or invested capital within their group of legal forms (that is one 
LLC with number of members equal 185, one LLC with invested capital close to 445,700PLN 
/ 118,400EUR, one Union with 700 members, and one association with 171 members), were 
still functioning and ranked as partially successful on the scale proposed by BANASZAK 
(2008b). On other hand, for Limited Liability Companies, which are the most costly forms, 
among three with the lowest level of invested capital (below 6,000 PLN / 1,550 EUR), there 
was one group, which achieved a full success and two groups, which failed and were no lon-
ger functioning.  
5 Conclusions 
Polish agricultural producer groups are examples of new forms of cooperative arrangements 
on agricultural markets. The functions they fulfill as business enterprises but also within their 
local communities are similar to traditional rural cooperatives. However, due to the ideologi-
cal burden they experiment with new legal forms of governance. Among the 62 organizations 
subjected to the research the groups were functioning most frequently as associations, unions, 
and limited liability companies. Only two of them were operating as cooperatives. 
The results show that the choices taken at the beginning of the cooperation related to the 
group constitution are crucial and determine ensuing operational activities. This link, howe-
ver, was in some cases neither fully recognized by the agricultural extension service nor the 
farmers interviewed. It was important for the success of the groups that the legal form provi-
ded sufficient safeguards and encouraged investments and commitment.  
The implications of the study are in particular interesting for policy-making in other transition 
and developing countries where cooperatives are also negatively perceived. New governance 
forms of cooperative arrangements such as limited liability companies or unions are promi-
sing. They are more flexible and cheaper than the traditional form of cooperative, are free of 
the ideological burden, and are well perceived on the market. The legal assistance for coope-
rative organizations has to be provided with caution. Some level of initial member invest-
ments as well as legal framework which guaranties transparency and encourages future in-
vestments are necessary to ensure member commitment and provide safeguards for the 
growth of the enterprise. 
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